Concurrent Civil and Criminal Remedies under Section 138 NI Act: *Smt. Rama Oberoi v. State (NCT of Delhi)

General
1

Introduction

On 3 September 2025, the Delhi High Court in Smt. Rama Oberoi v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., CRL.M.C. 6228/2025, dismissed a petition seeking quashing of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”). Justice Girish Kathpalia held that the petition was “completely frivolous,” imposed costs of ₹10,000, and clarified important aspects regarding the maintainability of criminal complaints alongside civil recovery proceedings, computation of limitation periods, and the scope of High Court’s power under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”).

Factual Background

The petitioner, Smt. Rama Oberoi, was summoned by a trial magistrate vide order dated 12 June 2025 to face trial for dishonour of cheques. Challenging the summoning order, she approached the High Court contending that:

  1. The complaint was premature, allegedly filed before expiry of the statutory waiting period following service of notice.
  2. The cheques in question did not bear her genuine signatures.
  3. Since the complainant had already instituted a civil suit for recovery of the same dues, the criminal complaint was not maintainable.

Issues and Judicial Reasoning

1. Simultaneous Civil and Criminal Remedies

The Court reaffirmed that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal prosecution under Section 138 NI Act. Referring to the well-settled principle that remedies are concurrent and not mutually exclusive, the Court emphasized that:

  • A civil suit seeks a decree for the outstanding amount.
  • A criminal complaint seeks penal consequences, including imprisonment.

This reasoning echoes the Supreme Court’s observations in P. Swami v. P. Arumugam, (2007) 15 SCC 175, and ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer, (2002) 6 SCC 426, where it was held that civil liability and criminal liability arising from the same transaction may coexist.

2. Computation of Limitation under Section 138

The petitioner argued that the complaint was filed before completion of the statutory 45-day period. The Court, however, clarified the statutory scheme:

  • 15 days are provided to the drawer to make payment upon service of notice [Proviso (c) to Section 138 NI Act].
  • If payment is not made, cause of action arises after expiry of this 15-day period.
  • The complainant then has one month to file a complaint [Section 142(b) NI Act].

In the present case, notice was served on 22 September 2022. The payment window expired on 7 October 2022, and the complaint was filed on 29 October 2022, well within the permissible period expiring on 6 November 2022.

The Court’s reasoning is consistent with Sil Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567, where the Supreme Court clarified the sequential nature of these statutory periods.

3. Disputed Signatures on Cheques

The petitioner further contended that the cheques did not bear her genuine signatures. The Court noted that the instruments carried her printed name as drawer/signatory, and whether the signatures were genuine was a matter of trial.

It reiterated that, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC), the High Court cannot conduct a “mini-trial.” This aligns with precedents such as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which circumscribed the scope of inherent powers to prevent abuse of process but prohibited premature adjudication of factual disputes.

Outcome

Finding no merit in any of the submissions, the Court dismissed the petition with exemplary costs of ₹10,000, directing deposit with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee (DHCLSC).

Significance

This decision reaffirms three critical propositions in cheque dishonour jurisprudence:

  1. Civil and criminal remedies arising from the same transaction are not mutually exclusive.
  2. The limitation structure under Section 138 NI Act consists of distinct phases—compliance period followed by a complaint period—which must be read harmoniously.
  3. Questions relating to genuineness of signatures or other factual disputes fall within the domain of trial and cannot be decided at the quashing stage.

By dismissing the petition as frivolous, the Court underscored its disapproval of attempts to delay or derail criminal proceedings through technical objections.